Fiskars Group
bd_60af196b5a289447 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Fiskars Group →Press / market disclosure — not a breach-notification filing
A media or market posting that confirms an incident but carries no breach-notification fields, so compliance clocks aren't assessable. The summary below is extracted from the coverage — verify against the source.
Data Breach Notification. Fiskars Group: On April 26, 2024, Fiskars Group discovered unauthorized activity on its network that occurred between March 31 and April 8, 2024, during which an actor obtained files containing personal information. The review completed on October 15, 2024 determined that affected individuals’ names and Social Security numbers were exposed. Fiskars engaged cybersecurity experts, notified law enforcement, enhanced its security measures, and is offering affected individuals complimentary 24-month membership in Experian IdentityWorks for identity protection. The cyberattack was claimed by akira on 2024-05-14. Linked ransomware group: akira.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Apr 26, 2024
Press report
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Attack → press
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Ransomware claims (2)
- Leak Siteakirabd_15cc21711cdd37e02024-05-14 · +18dVerified by operator
- Leak Siteakirabd_f93596bcd8001e912024-04-26Verified by operator
Regulatory filings (6) · sorted by filing gap
- Montana State AGbd_2546ee2e339cdcde2024-11-06 · +194dVerified by operator
- Oregon State AGbd_3585e5f80d5ec4cf2024-11-06 · +194dVerified by operator
- Massachusetts State AGbd_43f427ee9b5695042024-11-06 · +194dVerified by operator
- Maine State AGbd_71af1a5813a10fc82024-11-06 · +194dVerified by operator
Show 2 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 194d gap
- Vermont State AGbd_74a709a0860f528d2024-11-06 · +194dVerified
- Indiana State AGbd_9eef7464f82ecc2a2024-11-06 · +194dVerified by operator
Filing propagation · 7 filings · 6 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Apr 26, last Nov 6 (IN) — a 194-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- incident type + narrative only (may be machine-translated)
- discovery date
- materiality
- affected count
- data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs