Social EngineeringProfessional ServicesProfessional ServicesPhishingStolen CredentialsData ExfiltratedCustomer Data InvolvedIdentity (basic)Government IDMediumContained

Kearns, Brinen & Monaghan

bd_5e053d5c3da6e6dd · schema v1 · pii pii-v1

Severity

Medium

Discovered

Jul 15, 2019

Filed

Oct 1, 2019

To disclose

11 weeks

Affected

1state residents only

Linked

2 filings

Confidence

65%

Full breach record for Kearns, Brinen & Monaghan →

Kearns, Brinen & Monaghan notified individuals of a data breach where two email accounts were compromised via phishing. The attacker forwarded emails containing names, addresses, and SSNs from Oct 2018 to July 2019. The firm engaged third-party investigators, secured accounts, implemented 2FA, and offered credit monitoring.

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Incident timeline

undetected · 274 days

discovery → filing · 11 weeks / 78 days

Oct 14, 2018

Begins

Jul 15, 2019

Discovered

Oct 1, 2019

Filed

vs. sector median

8 wks faster

This filing is one of 2 about the same incident.View merged incident

Linked disclosures

Why this link?

Regulatory filings (1) · sorted by filing gap

Massachusetts State AGbd_bd7b870bc2ed3cf22019-10-01Verified

Name: Kearns, Brinen & Monaghan
norm: kearns brinen monaghan

Name: Kearns, Brinen & Monaghan
norm: kearns brinen monaghan
Industry: Professional Servicesllm

Discovered: Jul 15, 2019
Breach occurred: Oct 14, 2018 – Jul 15, 2019
Undetected for: 274 daysoccurrence → discovery
Materiality determined: —
Notification sent: —
Affected individuals: 1state-resident count only
Data types: Identity (basic)Government ID
Data elements: Social Security number
Attack vector: Phishing
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078 Valid AccountsT1114 Email Collection
Threat actor: ExternalFinancial
Initial access: phishing_link

During the incident: Engaged a third-party IT services firm to investigate the incident
Removed the inbox rule to stop the forwarding of emails
Changed the account passwords
Reviewed internal data management and protocols
Implemented enhanced security measures, including two-factor authentication
Prepared an attached sheet describing steps to protect identity, credit, and personal information
Contracted with Identity Fraud, Inc. to provide credit monitoring and identity protection services
Changes made: Implemented two-factor authentication
Reviewed internal data management and protocols
Implementing enhanced security measures to help prevent this type of incident from recurring
Source: Quoted from the filing itself, not independently verified.

Time to disclose: 11 weeks(78 days from discovery to filing)
Compliance flags: — (clock not assessable for this source)

Status: No extraction artifact recorded for this disclosure.

Filing propagation · 2 filings · 2 states

View merged incident ↗

Massachusetts State AGOct 1 · first

Montana State AGOct 1 · first · this page

Evidence ladder

Leak-site claim

Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.

Press / market report

Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.

State AG / regulator filingThis record

Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.

SEC 8-K / victim statement

Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.

Source URL: https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/OCP/General-Notice.pdf
DisclosureLens links to the originating regulator URL — full filing bodies are not redistributed from public surfaces (§4.5).
Filed at: Oct 1, 2019
Raw hash: ebf66d1585a87d009ddb6c09d574caf298df4266848f65d7cbabf3d72d5824be

Linked disclosures

Regulatory filings (1) · sorted by filing gap

Reporting entityKearns, Brinen & Monaghan

Victim entityKearns, Brinen & Monaghan

Incidentdiscovered Jul 15, 2019

Stated responseEngaged a third-party IT services firm to investigate the incident

Complianceclock not assessable

Extraction provenanceno artifact recorded

Source provenancedojmt.gov