Social EngineeringOtherPhishingStolen CredentialsBECMulti-Stage ChainCustomer Data InvolvedEmployee Data InvolvedIdentity (basic)Government IDFinancial accountMediumContained

Aramark

bd_5dec2a0987bd4964 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1

Severity

Medium

Discovered

Aug 22, 2024

Filed

Sep 19, 2024

To disclose

28 days

Affected

1state residents only

Linked

3 filings

Confidence

67%

Full breach record for Aramark →

Aramark notified the NH Attorney General of a phishing incident where employees were tricked into entering credentials on a fake myPay site. Bad actors accessed official accounts to change direct deposit info. 1 NH resident affected. Notification sent Sept 10, 2024. Credit monitoring offered.

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Incident timeline

discovery → filing · 28 days

Aug 22, 2024

Discovered

Sep 19, 2024

Filed

vs. sector median

4 wks faster

This filing is one of 3 about the same incident.View merged incident

Linked disclosures

Why this link?

Regulatory filings (2) · sorted by filing gap

Massachusetts State AGbd_b7317564a36a0c262024-09-13 · +6dVerified
Indiana State AGbd_47fe2d85ff66270e2024-09-10 · +9dCandidate

Name: Aramark
norm: aramark
Domain: aramark.com

Name: Aramark
norm: aramark
Domain: aramark.com
Industry: Otherllm

Discovered: Aug 22, 2024
Materiality determined: —
Notification sent: Sep 10, 2024
Affected individuals: 1state-resident count only
Data types: Identity (basic)Government IDFinancial account
Attack vector: Phishing
MITRE ATT&CK: T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkT1078 Valid AccountsT1071 Application Layer Protocol
Threat actor: ExternalFinancial
Regulator citations: Notified New Hampshire Office of the Attorney General
Initial access: phishing_link

During the incident: Offering complimentary access to Experian IdentityWorks
Sending notifications by mail to affected individuals
Working with industry partners to help prevent future fraud involving fake myPay sites
Changes made: Working with industry partners to help prevent future fraud involving fake myPay sites
Source: Quoted from the filing itself, not independently verified.

Time to disclose: 28 days(28 days from discovery to filing)
Compliance flags: — (clock not assessable for this source)

Status: No extraction artifact recorded for this disclosure.

Filing propagation · 3 filings · 3 states

View merged incident ↗

Indiana State AGSep 10 · first

Massachusetts State AG+3d

New Hampshire State AG+9d · this page

Pattern: first filing Sep 10 (IN), last Sep 19 (NH) — a 9-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?

Evidence ladder

Leak-site claim

Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.

Press / market report

Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.

State AG / regulator filingThis record

Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.

SEC 8-K / victim statement

Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.

Source URL: https://mm.nh.gov/files/uploads/doj/remote-docs/aramark-20240919.pdf
DisclosureLens links to the originating regulator URL — full filing bodies are not redistributed from public surfaces (§4.5).
Filed at: Sep 19, 2024
Raw hash: 01957e717c1626b76a0e317e28cdfccce4c3df9d1addeb51918fe3ed4df799ca

Linked disclosures

Regulatory filings (2) · sorted by filing gap

Reporting entityAramark

Victim entityAramark

Incidentdiscovered Aug 22, 2024

Stated responseOffering complimentary access to Experian IdentityWorks

Complianceclock not assessable

Extraction provenanceno artifact recorded

Source provenancemm.nh.gov