HackingHospitalityHospitalityStolen CredentialsData ExfiltratedCustomer Data InvolvedPCIFinancial accountPIILowContained

sbe

bd_5b36cd5840105b0c · schema v1 · pii pii-v1

Severity

Low

Discovered

Jun 6, 2017

Filed

Jul 14, 2017

To disclose

5 weeks

Affected

8state residents only

Linked

6 filings

Confidence

64%

Full breach record for sbe →

SBE ENT Holdings, EEC notified guests of a data security incident involving its third-party reservations provider, Sabre Hospitality Solutions. Unauthorized access occurred between August 10, 2016, and March 9, 2017, via stolen credentials. Payment card data and limited PII were accessed. Sabre engaged forensic investigators and notified law enforcement.

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Incident timeline

undetected · 300 days

discovery → filing · 5 weeks / 38 days

Aug 10, 2016

Begins

Jun 6, 2017

Discovered

Jul 14, 2017

Filed

This filing is one of 6 about the same incident.View merged incident

Linked disclosures

Why this link?

Regulatory filings (5) · sorted by filing gap

Washington State AGbd_7e31f6bcb093ce4c2017-07-14Verified
Massachusetts State AGbd_0c00d42f0b4284ad2017-07-16 · +2dVerified
South Carolina State AGbd_8ea2d80a85b24fda2017-07-18 · +4dVerified
California State AGbd_61539978b5411ff82017-07-22 · +8dVerified

Show 1 more filing ↓up to 8d gap

Oregon State AGbd_ac19bb5ba02f174a2017-07-22 · +8dVerified by operator

Name: sbe
Domain: sbe.com

Name: sbe
Domain: sbe.com
Industry: Hospitalityllm

Discovered: Jun 6, 2017
Breach occurred: Aug 10, 2016 – Mar 9, 2017
Undetected for: 300 daysoccurrence → discovery
Materiality determined: —
Notification sent: Jul 14, 2017
Affected individuals: 8state-resident count only
Data types: PCIFinancial accountPII
Attack vector: Third-Party / Supply Chain
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078 Valid AccountsT1119 Automated Collection
Threat actor: ExternalFinancial
Third party: via Sabre Hospitality Solutions
Initial access: valid_credentials

During the incident: Engaged a leading cybersecurity firm to support its investigation
Took measures to stop the unauthorized access to the CRS
Notified law enforcement
Notified the payment card brands, such as MasterCard and Visa
Source: Quoted from the filing itself, not independently verified.

Time to disclose: 5 weeks(38 days from discovery to filing)
Compliance flags: — (clock not assessable for this source)

Status: No extraction artifact recorded for this disclosure.

Filing propagation · 6 filings · 6 states

View merged incident ↗

Washington State AGJul 14 · first

Montana State AGJul 14 · first · this page

Massachusetts State AG+2d

South Carolina State AG+4d

California State AG+8d

Oregon State AG+8d

Pattern: first filing Jul 14 (WA), last Jul 22 (OR) — a 8-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?

Evidence ladder

Leak-site claim

Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.

Press / market report

Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.

State AG / regulator filingThis record

Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.

SEC 8-K / victim statement

Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.

Source URL: https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/SBE-ENT-Holdings.pdf
DisclosureLens links to the originating regulator URL — full filing bodies are not redistributed from public surfaces (§4.5).
Filed at: Jul 14, 2017
Raw hash: a60248479e7ea90c6fdb1f8cb40693717413dac9b6655b25dbca478c376fd0cc

Linked disclosures

Regulatory filings (5) · sorted by filing gap

Reporting entitysbe

Victim entitysbe

Incidentdiscovered Jun 6, 2017

Stated responseEngaged a leading cybersecurity firm to support its investigation

Complianceclock not assessable

Extraction provenanceno artifact recorded

Source provenancedojmt.gov