Chicago Family Health Center, Inc.
bd_54f7078d105b14b7 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Chicago Family Health Center, Inc. →2 incidents on fileThreat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group ALPHV / BlackCat on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Since Moses L. Walker and his colleagues opened the doors for the first time in 1971, Family Health Center (FHC) has been serving community members who are in need of quality and compassionate healthcare. From humble beginnings in a converted trailer to the current state-of-the-art $10 million facility on the same plot of land at the corner of Paterson and Burdick Streets, FHC has become the county’s only Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC). FHC has also been accredited as a community-based health center by the National Committee for Quality Assurance for over a decade. What began as a group of dedicated community advocates, volunteer doctors, nurses and assistants is now, more than 53 years later, one of Michigan’s most highly recognized FQHCs. Our team offers comprehensive health services at three locations, with an additional set of mobile health and dental units. Our staff administers approximately 165,000 patient visits annually as part of our commitment to serve the community members of Kalamazoo. Our leadership and staff at FHC are also passionate about community engagement. Our annual events include the Dr. Lisandra Soto Dental Day of Caring and Back to School Bash. FHC also provides Medical Assistant training to community members interested in pursuing this career path. One of the hallmarks of FHC is our compassionate staff. We are grateful to all our team members who remain dedicated to honoring Mr. Walker’s legacy and mission of keeping our community members healthy and strong. As we continue our mission to provide quality health care to everyone, we remember our promise to treat our patients with dignity and respect.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Feb 23, 2024
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (4) · sorted by filing gap
- HHS OCRbd_72add7d59a14ecad2024-03-24 · +29dCandidate
- Indiana State AGbd_86eb3f69582d61d12024-06-05 · +102dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_b4291f53120883bd2024-06-05 · +102dVerified by operator
- Maine State AGbd_c750e7e318bbe8962024-06-05 · +102dVerified
Filing propagation · 5 filings · 4 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Feb 23, last Jun 5 (ME) — a 102-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
alphv
According to ransomware.live, The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language. Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations). As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data. ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attacks against the organization. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs