JA Riollano
bd_4cb85595edd21187 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for JA Riollano →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
We obtained about 28gb of data of the following companies: JA Riollano Co, Inc. is a leading provider of school, office, cra ft, and copy supplies featuring the largest inventory and variety of educational products. The company offers online shopping with options for in-store pickup or direct shipping to offices. M&W Hydraulics specializes in designing and manufacturing custom hydraulic manifolds for mission-critical applications across vari ous industries. Their services include in-house design, rapid pro totyping, and integration, ensuring tailored solutions that meet specific client needs. Mirbeau Inn & Spa offers French-inspired hotel and spa resorts lo cated in Skaneateles, Albany, Rhinebeck, NY, and Plymouth, MA. Th e company focuses on providing a sanctuary for those seeking bala nce in their lives, emphasizing a restful ambiance and classic pl easures. Reuland produces standard Electric Motor Laminations as well as L aminations for custom applications. From High Speed Liquid Cooled motors to standard rated motors, Reuland has a solution for your application. Spectorgroup is a collective of architects, designers, strategist s, planners, and problem solvers dedicated to creating inspired s paces that foster teamwork and collaboration. You will find personal employee personal data, medical informatio n, client information, numerous project files, confidential files , accounting and financials and other internal operational files.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Jan 23, 2026
Claim posted
—
No filing yet · watching
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
No regulatory filing corroborates this yet — it is the attacker's own assertion. Watch this entity to be notified the moment a filing corroborates or contradicts it.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs