Pain Care
bd_46d5a4efb6b710e1 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Pain Care →2 incidents on fileThreat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group ALPHV / BlackCat on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
September 13th network of the "PainCare Specialists" pain management provider's company was breached by our team. As a result of our hack attack the network has been encrypted and over 150GB of sensitive data were stolen from there. Those data includes patient's and employee's medical records, social security numbers, employees ID's, contracts, drug screens, payments and another sensitive info. In addition we have gained access to portals of federal medical regulation web-resources that allows managing of prescribed medicine and provides access to medical records of various individuals. Top management of PainCare Specialists headed by president Poly Chen refused to contact us and protect data of their employees and patients, that decision violates their own policy which states that "Patients can expect that all communications and records about their care will be confidential, unless disclosure is allowed by law" We have faced complete indifference from Poly Chen, Yonguen Cho, David Keen, Donald Winder and other top management representative of this business. They are receiving and reading our messages but still refusing to answer. That is why now everyone can see example of files stolen from PainCare Specialists which includes data supposed to be protected by Mr.Poly Chen and his team. In case if Mr.Chen and his team will not contact us until September 26th. All the data related to PainCare Specialists will be released for free. Anyway we are giving another chance to PainCare Specialists to contact us until September 26th and protect data of their employees and patients
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Sep 22, 2023
Claim posted
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No filing yet · watching
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
No regulatory filing corroborates this yet — it is the attacker's own assertion. Watch this entity to be notified the moment a filing corroborates or contradicts it.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
alphv
According to ransomware.live, The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language. Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations). As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data. ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attacks against the organization. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs