DisclosureLens
GLOBALMalwareConstructionConstructionRansomwareAkiraRansom DemandedActor NamedMedium

Naza TTDI Sdn Bhd

bd_4512807552c94503 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1

Severity

Medium

Discovered

Filed

Apr 2, 2025

To disclose

Affected

Not disclosed

Confidence

50%
Full breach record for Naza TTDI Sdn Bhd

Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing

This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.

Group activity: ConstructionDiscovered: 2025-04-02

Source: Ransomware.live

Post text · scraped from the leak site

The company established its foothold in the industry through the development of notable townships and buildings. These development s which are centred around Klang Valley includes the 662-acre Tam an Tun Dr Ismail, TTDI Alam Impian, Stadium Malawati, Masjid Al-I khlas, and TTDI Jaya. We are ready to upload a lot of essential corporate documents suc h as: corporate NDA’s, employee passport numbers, corporate licen ses, agreements and contracts, contact numbers and e-mail address es of employees and customers, financial data (audits, payment de tails, reports), etc.

Incident timeline — mostly unverified

? — ?

Breach window unknown

Apr 2, 2025

Claim posted

No filing yet · watching

Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.

Claim → filing

Compliance clock

Not assessable

Tracked as a single-filing incident — the only disclosure on record for this event so far.Unverified claimView incident

Evidence ladder

Leak-site claimThis record

Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.

Press / market report

Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.

State AG / regulator filing

Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.

SEC 8-K / victim statement

Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.

No regulatory filing corroborates this yet — it is the attacker's own assertion. Watch this entity to be notified the moment a filing corroborates or contradicts it.

Source ceiling

  • actor name
  • victim claim
  • ransom/leak status
  • discovery date
  • materiality
  • notification
  • affected count
  • confirmed data types
  • compliance clock

The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.

About this groupFirst seen 2023-04-12

akira

According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs

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