O'Brien Steel Service
bd_34e1da08cbddc275 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for O'Brien Steel Service →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
O’Brien Steel Service is stocked and equipped to service customers of all sizes, ranging from small job shops to the largest OEMs in the USA. More than 70 GB of data will be published soon, including:- Financial documents and reports for 22-23 years;- HR;- Projects;- Employment contracts and documents;- IT documents;- Administrative documents.And also: -Contacts.csv - 5069 lines Clietns data;-Customers.csv - 3596 lines of the Companies data; -Competitors.csv - 3470 lines Suppliers data.Wait for the release.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Aug 30, 2023
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (3) · sorted by filing gap
- Indiana State AGbd_317ce66c35f7739b2023-09-21 · +22dVerified
- Maine State AGbd_2ee698abcfbb22e52023-09-22 · +23dVerified by operator
- Illinois State AGbd_0ab7f07ab657a84d2023-01-01 · +241dVerified by operator
Filing propagation · 4 filings · 3 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Jan 1 (IL), last Sep 22 (ME) — a 264-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs