Wiggins, Childs, Pantazis, Fisher, & Goldfarb LLC
bd_2dfa04eeb2e94bff · schema v1 · pii pii-v2
Full breach record for Wiggins, Childs, Pantazis, Fisher, & Goldfarb LLC →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Insomnia on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Large U.S. plaintiffs firm with Alabama, D.C., and Florida offices. Since 1985, it’s been known for excellence in discrimination, consumer protection, and employment law, leading class actions that advance protections for victims.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Sep 15, 2026
Claim posted
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No filing yet · watching
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
No regulatory filing corroborates this yet — it is the attacker's own assertion. Watch this entity to be notified the moment a filing corroborates or contradicts it.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
insomnia
According to ransomware.live, Insomnia is a data-theft and extortion group that emerged in October 2025, targeting primarily US-based healthcare organizations — stealing patient files and threatening public exposure rather than encrypting files — and avoiding former Soviet states, consistent with Russian-speaking cybercrime norms.