Seiko Group Corporation
bd_28eae7ad0ddb2169 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Seiko Group Corporation →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group ALPHV / BlackCat on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Seiko Group Corporation, commonly known as Seiko, is a Japanese maker of watches, clocks, electronic devices, semiconductors, jewelry, and optical products. This company has low security of its network and products. As a result it's network has been breached by ALPHV Ransomware Team and a lot of critical data was stolen from Seiko's network through this breach. Total volume of stolen data is 2,5TB. Downloaded data includes sensitive and confidential information about Seiko's business processes and products. Short list of downloaded data: - watch blueprints - new watch models development - watch designs - watch designs development - unreleased models - working prototype models with images - points of sales information - sales reports - invoices and orders - payments - shops blueprints - employees working hours - employees emails - employees related documents - employees personal sensitive data - contracts and agreements - confidential documents - product and material tests - marketing strategies - financial data - audits - passports of visitors - intercompany documents - NPC product development - NPC product tests - NPC production development - NPC quality control - And this is definitely not the full list of data we have downloaded form Seiko's network. Since company's top management decided not to negotiate about data recovery we are starting to publish their data. In following samples you can find some blueprints and confidential files. All the data belonging to Seiko Group Corporation will be released for free download in closest future in case if we will not make an agreement with their management or we will not met an offer from buyers which we will not be able to refuse. This sample of files is free to share, because of Seiko's top management's indifference to this incident.
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Aug 21, 2023
Claim posted
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No filing yet · watching
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
No regulatory filing corroborates this yet — it is the attacker's own assertion. Watch this entity to be notified the moment a filing corroborates or contradicts it.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
alphv
According to ransomware.live, The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language. Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations). As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data. ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attacks against the organization. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs