Old National Events Plaza
bd_25c8ca1045c877fe · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Old National Events Plaza →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
The impressive 280,000 square-foot, state-of-the-art fa cility, offers affordable, flexible space and in-house services to make the planning and coordinating of your event a breeze. You will find a lot of sensitive corporate documents su ch as: confidential licenses, agreements and contracts, financial data (audits, payment details, reports), con tact numbers and e-mail addresses of employees and cust omers, etc. We have made the process of downloading company data as simple as possible for our users. All you need is any torrent client (like Vuze, Utorrent, qBittorrent or Tra nsmission to use magnet links). You will find the torre nt file above. 1. Open uTorrent, or any another torrent client. 2. Add torrent file or paste the magnet URL to upload t he data safely. 3. Archives have no password. MAGNET URL: magnet:?xt=urn:btih:78CC40182A586A88613293F A63B79084025497EE&dn=oldnationaleventsplaza.com&tr=udp: //tracker.openbittorrent.com:80/announce&tr=udp://track er.opentrackr.org:1337/announce
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Jan 9, 2025
Claim posted
—
Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Ransomware claims (1)
- Leak Siteakirabd_6b015cbb7386c45c2025-01-09Verified by operator
Regulatory filings (2) · sorted by filing gap
- Massachusetts State AGbd_04170c1a5c083d472025-04-03 · +84dVerified
- Indiana State AGbd_f59678a3a6a964cf2025-04-03 · +84dCandidate
Filing propagation · 3 filings · 2 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Jan 9, last Apr 3 (IN) — a 84-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs