NORTON HEALTHCARE, INC.
bd_200f7e5d5a5d687c · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for NORTON HEALTHCARE, INC. →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group ALPHV / BlackCat on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Norton Healthcare is a Kentucky health care system with more than 40 clinics and hospitals in and around Louisville, Kentucky. The hospital and health care system is the Louisville area's third largest private employer, located at more than 140 locations throughout Greater Louisville and Southern Indiana. The Louisville-based system includes six hospitals (one being in Madison, Indiana) with 1,993 licensed beds, eight outpatient centers, 18 Norton Immediate Care Centers, over 1,700 employees, over 1,500 employed medical providers, and approximately 2,000 total physicians on its medical staff. According to Business First of Louisville, Norton Healthcare is the Louisville area's third largest employer, with more than 17,000 employees. Norton Healthcare employs some 4,000 nurses and has nearly 2,000 affiliated physicians. Additionally, Norton Healthcare has programs in place to support nursing students attending both public and private universities in Kentucky and Indiana. Revenue : 2.6B USD
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Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
May 25, 2023
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Regulatory filings (10) · sorted by filing gap
- HHS OCRbd_24b4a063f740cc5a2023-07-07 · +43dCandidate
- Maine State AGbd_0881b4fc047b0f642023-12-08 · +197dVerified
- Montana State AGbd_426bccd437fdbc352023-12-08 · +197dVerified
- California State AGbd_434c49c9d04039112023-12-08 · +197dVerified
Show 6 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 202d gap
- Washington State AGbd_64845bb10ad9fa4e2023-12-08 · +197dVerified
- South Carolina State AGbd_6bc5c9b6118928e92023-12-08 · +197dVerified
- Massachusetts State AGbd_b11b07c1a24ec22e2023-12-08 · +197dVerified
- Vermont State AGbd_ec812b620ee89de82023-12-08 · +197dVerified
- New Hampshire State AGbd_8ea130c0a23300942023-12-11 · +200dVerified
- Oregon State AGbd_7bb3ea95da317ae32023-12-13 · +202dVerified
Showing first 10 of 11 linked disclosures.
Filing propagation · 11 filings · 10 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing May 25, last Dec 13 (OR) — a 202-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Cascade drawn from the first 10 linked disclosures of 11 — the full spread may be wider.
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
alphv
According to ransomware.live, The operators of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware began their activity in December 2021, making posts on Dark Web forums to promote their affiliate program, offering other actors the opportunity to engage in a 'new type of ransomware family' developed from scratch using the Rust programming language. Some clear evidence indicates that the actors behind this new ransomware are not new to cybercrime, and there were links to other affiliate programs such as DarkSide, BlackMatter, and REvil. (After several attacks against large companies, these groups faced pressure and arrests, necessitating the termination of their operations). As a security measure, the operators of ALPHV implemented the requirement for the execution of the ransomware payload by providing an 'access token,' which is supplied by the owners of the Ransomware-as-a-Service to the affiliate. This token is added to the victim's ransom note so that they can contact the threat actor responsible for encrypting the data. ALPHV affiliates employ double and triple extortion techniques, meaning the publication of the company's name on leak sites, threats of data leakage, and lastly, threats of DDoS attacks against the organization. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs