Social EngineeringOtherPhishingStolen CredentialsCustomer Data InvolvedTargetedIdentity (basic)Government IDFinancial accountHealth (basic)MediumContained

Parkhurst Dining

bd_0264a11849c61356 · schema v1 · pii pii-v1

Severity

Medium

Discovered

Apr 20, 2017

Filed

Jun 13, 2017

To disclose

8 weeks

Affected

1state residents only

Linked

2 filings

Confidence

67%

Full breach record for Parkhurst Dining →

Parkhurst Dining notified the NH AG of a phishing incident affecting 1 NH resident. A team member clicked a phishing link and entered credentials on April 20, 2017. The actor accessed the email account, potentially exposing names, DOB, SSN, financial accounts, and medical info. Parkhurst engaged forensic investigators, secured the account, and provided 2 years of Kroll credit monitoring.

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Incident timeline

discovery → filing · 8 weeks / 54 days

Apr 20, 2017

Discovered

Jun 13, 2017

Filed

vs. sector median

1 wks faster

This filing is one of 2 about the same incident.View merged incident

Linked disclosures

Why this link?

Regulatory filings (1) · sorted by filing gap

Massachusetts State AGbd_444d7d6a810f4ecd2017-06-13Verified

Name: Parkhurst Dining
norm: parkhurst dining

Name: Parkhurst Dining
norm: parkhurst dining
Industry: Otherllm

Discovered: Apr 20, 2017
Materiality determined: —
Notification sent: Jun 13, 2017
Affected individuals: 1state-resident count only
Data types: Identity (basic)Government IDFinancial accountHealth (basic)
Attack vector: Phishing
MITRE ATT&CK: T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkT1078 Valid AccountsT1114 Email Collection
Threat actor: External
Regulator citations: Notified New Hampshire Attorney General
Initial access: phishing_link

During the incident: Secured the team member's email account
Launched an in-depth investigation with the help of an outside computer forensic investigator
Conducted a programmatic and manual review of the contents of the email account
Provided all potentially affected individuals access to 2 free years of credit and identity monitoring services through Kroll
Established a dedicated hotline for potentially affected individuals
Provided guidance on how to better protect against identity theft and fraud
Provided written notice of this incident to other state regulators as necessary
Changes made: Secured the services of Kroll to provide identity monitoring at no cost for two years
Source: Quoted from the filing itself, not independently verified.

Time to disclose: 8 weeks(54 days from discovery to filing)
Compliance flags: — (clock not assessable for this source)

Status: No extraction artifact recorded for this disclosure.

Filing propagation · 2 filings · 2 states

View merged incident ↗

Massachusetts State AGJun 13 · first

New Hampshire State AGJun 13 · first · this page

Evidence ladder

Leak-site claim

Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.

Press / market report

Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.

State AG / regulator filingThis record

Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.

SEC 8-K / victim statement

Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.

Source URL: https://mm.nh.gov/files/uploads/doj/remote-docs/parkhurst-dining-20170613.pdf
DisclosureLens links to the originating regulator URL — full filing bodies are not redistributed from public surfaces (§4.5).
Filed at: Jun 13, 2017
Raw hash: 911095fdbddb099a41c1f4386761a6485d3e5c10fe907ee8f8a0bdd9f7e26555

Linked disclosures

Regulatory filings (1) · sorted by filing gap

Reporting entityParkhurst Dining

Victim entityParkhurst Dining

Incidentdiscovered Apr 20, 2017

Stated responseSecured the team member's email account

Complianceclock not assessable

Extraction provenanceno artifact recorded

Source provenancemm.nh.gov