Confirmed breach. Intrusion Apr 15, 2016–Jun 13, 2016, discovered Jun 13, 2016 — the first regulatory filing landed 79 days later. 18,414 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Affected (total reported)
18,414
Data types
—
Jurisdictions
2
MT WA
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Apr 21, 2016
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
53 days
Breach discovered
Jun 13, 2016
Reported by HHS OCR filing
79 days
🦬Montana State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
CHI Franciscan Healthcare Highline Medical Center (R-C Healthcare Management) reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-08-31. The breach occurred from 4/21/2016 to 6/13/2016. 15 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 15
🌲WASHINGTONHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
CHI Franciscan Health Highline Medical Center (WA) reported to HHS OCR on 2016-09-01 an Unauthorized Access/Disclosure affecting 18,399 individuals. A business associate inadvertently left files containing patient ePHI publicly accessible via the internet from approximately mid-April 2016 to June 13, 2016. Breached information located on Network Server included patient names, dates of service, health insurance information, and Social Security numbers. Following the breach, the CE terminated the BA relationship and the BA deleted all patient files from its systems.
Affected (this filing):
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.