Confirmed breach. Intrusion May 10, 2025, discovered Jun 27, 2025 — the first regulatory filing landed 13 days later. 3,512 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksLeak gap⏱ Leak >30dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
3,512
Data types
2
Identity (basic) · Health (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
IN VT
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
May 10, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
48 days
Breach discovered
Jun 27, 2025
Reported by VERMONT AG filing
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Mountain Laurel Dermatology reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2025-05-10 and was reported on 2025-07-10. 1 Indiana residents were affected. 3,512 individuals affected in total.
Mountain Laurel Dermatology notified consumers of a data security incident involving unauthorized access to an external cloud-based network system. The incident, detected on May 12, 2025, potentially exposed names, check images, and medical treatment or diagnosis information. The breach did not involve the electronic medical records system. The practice engaged independent experts and is implementing enhanced security measures.
Leak >30d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.