Confirmed breach. Intrusion Aug 10, 2025, discovered Aug 10, 2025 — the first regulatory filing landed 275 days later. 170 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksLeak gap⏱ Leak >90dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Affected (total reported)
170
Data types
—
Jurisdictions
2
NH VT
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Aug 10, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Tulane University reported a data breach to the Vermont Attorney General. The breach was reported to the AGO on 2026-05-12. The reporting organization type is Educational. 69 Vermont residents were affected. Categories of data breached: Social Security Numbers, Financial Account Codes, Credit or Debit Account Info.
Leak >90d
⛰️New Hampshire State AGMost recentlinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Tulane University notified the New Hampshire Attorney General of a data security incident involving a zero-day vulnerability in Oracle’s E-Business Suite. Unauthorized access occurred on August 10, 2025, exposing names, Social Security numbers, and direct deposit banking information of current and former employees and their dependents. Tulane notified law enforcement, applied patches, and began mailing notifications on April 2, 2026, offering one year of credit monitoring to 170 affected New Hampshire residents.
Affected (this filing): 170
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.