Confirmed breach. Intrusion Sep 9, 2021–Sep 12, 2021, discovered Sep 12, 2021 — the first regulatory filing landed 102 days later (flagged late). 1,509 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksMaine✗ ME AG >90d · 102dHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
1,509
Data types
2
Government ID · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
IL ME
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Sep 9, 2021 → Sep 12, 2021
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discoveredAG web form
Sep 12, 2021
Reported by MAINE AG filing
102 days
🇺🇸ILHHS OCRFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
C.E. Niehoff & Company reported to HHS on 2021-12-23 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 1509 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. The cyberattack compromised PHI including names, addresses, DOB, SSNs, diagnoses, and medications. The CE provided credit monitoring and strengthened safeguards.
Affected (this filing): 1,509
🦞Maine State AGMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
C.E. Niehoff & Co. reported a ransomware incident affecting 1,509 individuals, including 1 Maine resident. The breach occurred between September 9 and 12, 2021, compromising names and Social Security Numbers. The company notified affected individuals in writing on December 23, 2021, and provided 12 months of credit monitoring through Experian.
Affected (this filing): 1,509
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.