North American Risk Services reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2018-10-05. The breach occurred from 2/7/2018 to 3/27/2018. 10 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 10
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Oct 5, 2018. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_c08bc7e8796345de · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
CA MT
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Feb 7, 2018
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
North American Risk Services reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2018-10-05. The breach occurred from 2/7/2018 to 3/27/2018. 10 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 10
North American Risk Services, Inc. (NARS) experienced unauthorized access to employee email accounts from February 7, 2018, to March 27, 2018. The incident involved the exposure of personal information for 604 California residents, including names, Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, financial account information, and medical/health insurance information. NARS engaged a third-party forensic investigator, confirmed the scope of the breach, and notified affected individuals via mail in October 2018. The company is offering one year of complimentary credit monitoring and identity restoration services.
Affected (this filing): 604
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.