Confirmed breach. Intrusion Mar 2, 2021–Mar 5, 2021, discovered Jun 29, 2021 — the first regulatory filing landed 25 days later. 13,824 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedMaine✓ ME AG ≤30d · 30dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
13,824
Data types
3
Health (basic) · Identity (basic) · Government ID
Jurisdictions
3
FEDERAL ME MT
Linked filings
3
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Mar 2, 2021
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
NCH Corporation reported to HHS on 2021-07-24 a Hacking/IT Incident involving a ransomware attack that affected 11,427 individuals. The breach compromised names, birthdates, Social Security numbers, and health insurance information from a Network Server.
Affected (this filing): 11,427
HHS notified
🦬Montana State AGlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
NCH Corporation reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2021-07-29. The breach occurred from 3/2/2021 to 3/5/2021. 36 Montana residents were affected.
NCH Corporation reported an external system breach (hacking) occurring between March 2 and March 5, 2021, discovered on June 29, 2021. The incident affected 13,824 individuals, including 6 Maine residents. Acquired data included names and driver's license numbers. NCH provided one year of complimentary credit monitoring and identity theft protection services through Equifax.
Affected (this filing): 13,824
ME AG ≤30d · 30d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.