Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window May 20, 2026 → May 26, 2026. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_a9ccdd18229e4a4c · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Identity (basic)
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
ME NH
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Feb 5, 2026
Reported by MAINE AG filing
Feb 10, 2026
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Mar 5, 2026
Reported by NEW HAMPSHIRE AG filing
Parker Lipman LLP reported an external system breach (hacking) occurring on 02/10/2026, discovered on 02/05/2026. The incident affected 1,120 individuals, including 1 Maine resident. The firm notified affected parties in writing on 05/19/2026 and provided 24 months of credit monitoring via Cyberscout.
Affected (this filing): 1,120
Parker Lipman LLP notified New Hampshire AG John Formella on May 19, 2026, of a cybersecurity incident affecting two state residents. Unauthorized access occurred between February 10 and March 2, 2026, discovered on March 5, 2026. The breach compromised names, addresses, Social Security numbers, medical records, and bank account/routing numbers. Parker Lipman engaged external cybersecurity professionals and the FBI, and is providing affected residents with one year of complimentary credit monitoring.
Affected (this filing): 2
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.