American Symphony Orchestra League — May 2020 breach
One linked filing — more sources may join as they report · filed Oct 5, 2020. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_99cebc860520467e · merged by deterministic
Litigation Timing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay · Filing span — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Incident timeline
No discovery date is recorded on any filing in this cluster, so the notification delay is not computable. Dashed segments fill in as filings merge.
Member cascade — every filing about this breach
- OCT 5CA AGCA AG noticeonly filing · no count statedday 0
- Watching for additional filings — new sources merge into this incident automatically.
Roll-up facts — reconciled across members
- Breach window
- May 1, 2020 CA AG
- Discovered
- —
- Data types
- Identity (basic) · PII CA AG
- Attack vector
- Ransomware CA AG
- Response
- Blackbaud's Cyber Security team—together with independent forensics experts and law enforcement—expelled the cybercriminal from their system · Blackbaud paid the cybercriminal's demand and received confirmation that the copy they removed had been destroyed · Blackbaud quickly identified the vulnerability associated with this incident, including the tactics used by the cybercriminal, and took swift action to fix it CA AG
Each fact cites the member filing that establishes it; when filings conflict, every value shows with its source.
Evidence ladder — rungs this incident occupies
No leak-site claim on record for this incident.
No press coverage linked yet.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
No SEC filing or victim statement yet.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.