Confirmed breach. Intrusion Mar 25, 2024–Apr 12, 2024, discovered Apr 12, 2024 — the first regulatory filing landed 42 days later. 158,593 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksLeak gap⏱ Leak >30dVermont⏱ VT AG >14 bdayFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
158,593
Data types
2
Identity (basic) · Government ID
Jurisdictions
2
IN VT
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Mar 26, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Apr 12, 2024
Reported by VERMONT AG filing
42 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
TRC Staffing Services Inc dba TRC Talent Solutions reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-03-26 and was reported on 2024-05-24. 86 Indiana residents were affected. 158,593 individuals affected in total.
TRC Staffing Services (dba TRC Talent Solutions) disclosed a ransomware incident occurring between March 25 and April 12, 2024. Suspicious activity involving file encryption was identified on April 12. The incident may have exposed names and Social Security numbers of affected individuals. TRC notified federal law enforcement, secured its environment, and offered credit monitoring services. No evidence of identity theft was found at the time of notice.
VT AG >14 bday
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.