Confirmed breach. Intrusion Oct 16, 2023–Oct 27, 2023, discovered Oct 27, 2023 — the first regulatory filing landed 62 days later. 22,406 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksLeak gap⏱ Leak >30dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Affected (total reported)
22,406
Data types
—
Jurisdictions
2
IN NH
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Oct 16, 2023
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
St. Lucie County Tax Collector's Office reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2023-10-16 and was reported on 2023-12-28. 24 Indiana residents were affected. 22,406 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 22,406
Leak >30d
⛰️New Hampshire State AGMost recentlinked via multistate filing link · 100%
St. Lucie County Tax Collector’s Office (SLCTC) disclosed a cybersecurity incident affecting New Hampshire residents. Unauthorized access occurred between October 16 and October 27, 2023. SLCTC discovered unusual activity on October 27, 2023, and engaged third-party forensic specialists. The incident involved the acquisition of certain files by an unknown actor. SLCTC notified 15 New Hampshire residents on December 28, 2023, and reported the event to law enforcement. Additional safeguards were implemented.
Affected (this filing): 15
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.