Confirmed breach. Intrusion Jul 30, 2020, discovered Aug 21, 2020 — the first regulatory filing landed 110 days later (flagged late). 1 individuals reported across the linked filings.
U.S. Bank, N.A. reported the physical theft of a computer server from a corporate office on July 30, 2020. The server contained personally identifiable information, including names and Social Security numbers, of customers and related persons. The bank is offering two years of free credit monitoring and identity restoration services to affected individuals.
U.S. Bank, N.A. reported the physical theft of a computer server from a corporate office on July 30, 2020. The server contained personally identifiable information, including names and Social Security numbers, of customers and related parties. The bank is offering two years of credit monitoring and identity restoration services to affected individuals.
A computer server containing customer personally identifiable information (names and Social Security numbers) was physically stolen from a U.S. Bank corporate office on or around July 30, 2020. U.S. Bank worked with authorities to recover the server and offered two years of free credit monitoring via myTrueIdentity/TransUnion to affected individuals. The information may have been up to 10 or more years old.
🦞Maine State AGMost recentlinked via multistate filing link · 100%
A network server belonging to U.S. Bank, N.A. was stolen, which resulted in the exposure of personal information. The breach occurred on July 30, 2020, and was discovered on August 21, 2020. One resident of Maine was affected. The compromised data included names and Social Security numbers. U.S. Bank offered 24 months of identity theft protection services to those affected.
Affected (this filing): 1
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.