KontrolFreek reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-06-30. The breach occurred from 10/21/2015 to 4/7/2016. 7 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 7
Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filing window Jun 30, 2016 → Sep 16, 2016. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_7b249a00cfd84afc · merge_method human · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
MT OR WA
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Oct 21, 2015
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Jun 30, 2016
Reported by WASHINGTON AG filing
KontrolFreek reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-06-30. The breach occurred from 10/21/2015 to 4/7/2016. 7 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 7
KontrolFreek, a business sector entity reported a malware incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2016-06-30 and filed notice on 2016-08-22. 625 Washington residents were affected. 53 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 253 days to identify the breach. 0 days to contain the breach.
Affected (this filing): 625
KontrolFreek, LLC reported a data breach to the Oregon Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-09-16. The breach occurred during 10/21/2015 - 4/7/2016. Notice was sent on 6/30/20168/22/2016.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.