Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filing window Mar 9, 2026 → May 8, 2026. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_5426de6ee7d14a5b · merge_method human · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
CA IN NH
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Jul 10, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Dec 22, 2025
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Jan 16, 2026
Reported by NEW HAMPSHIRE AG filing
Automobile Club of Southern California (ACSC) reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2025-07-10 and was reported on 2026-03-09. 8 Indiana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 8
Automobile Club of Southern California (ACSC) notified the New Hampshire Attorney General of a security incident involving its vendor, DanubeNet, Inc. (DSS). Unauthorized access to DSS systems occurred between July 10, 2025, and August 19, 2025. ACSC determined on January 16, 2026, that member data was involved, specifically identifying records for three New Hampshire residents containing names and driver's permit/license numbers. ACSC mailed notifications on March 9, 2026, and offered one year of identity protection services.
Affected (this filing): 3
Automobile Club of Southern California (ACSC) notified members of a security incident involving third-party vendor DanubeNet, Inc. (Driving School Solutions). Unauthorized access to vendor systems occurred between July 10, 2025, and August 19, 2025. ACSC became aware of the incident on December 22, 2025. Affected data includes names and driver's permit/license numbers. ACSC is providing one year of credit monitoring and identity protection services.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.