Confirmed breach. Intrusion Feb 7, 2020–May 20, 2020, discovered Jul 16, 2020 — the first regulatory filing landed 32 days later. 22,718 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedOregon✓ OR AG ≤45dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Affected (total reported)
22,718
Data types
—
Jurisdictions
2
OR PA
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Feb 7, 2020 → May 20, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
160 days
Breach discoveredAG web form
Jul 16, 2020
Reported by OREGON AG filing
32 days
🇺🇸PAHHS OCRFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Richard J. Caron Foundation reported to HHS on 2020-08-17 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 22,718 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. A business associate experienced a ransomware attack affecting ePHI (names, addresses, DOB, emails, donor info). The CE notified HHS, individuals, and media.
Affected (this filing):
🦫Oregon State AGMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Richard J. Caron Foundation reported a data breach to the Oregon Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-08-20. The breach occurred during 2/7/2020 - 5/20/2020. The breach was discovered on 7/16/2020. 22,296 individuals were affected. Notice was sent on 8/17/2020.
Affected (this filing): 22,296
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.