Confirmed breach. Intrusion Nov 1, 2017, discovered Jan 15, 2018 — the first regulatory filing landed 88 days later (flagged late). 1,717 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksCalifornia✗ CA 60-day late · 67dHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
1,717
Data types
2
PHI · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
1
CA
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Nov 1, 2017
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
75 days
Breach discovered
Jan 15, 2018
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
88 days
🐻California State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Blue Shield of California disclosed that an employee inadvertently emailed Protected Health Information (PHI) to an unauthorized insurance broker in November 2017. The disclosed data included names, addresses, subscriber IDs, and plan details. Blue Shield reported the incident to CMS, disciplined the employees, retrained staff, and offered credit monitoring services.
CA 60-day late · 67d
🐻CALIFORNIAHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
California Physicians Service d/b/a Blue Shield of California reported to HHS on 2018-04-13 a Unauthorized Access/Disclosure affecting 1717 individuals. Breached information located on Email.
Affected (this filing): 1,717
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.