Verigent, LLC reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-07-17. The breach occurred from 1/3/2020 to 6/4/2020. 3 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 3
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Jul 17, 2020. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_4cd00c0067094a29 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
CA MT
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Jan 3, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Jan 3, 2020
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Verigent, LLC reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-07-17. The breach occurred from 1/3/2020 to 6/4/2020. 3 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 3
Verigent, LLC experienced a data breach involving unauthorized access to employee email accounts. The incident was discovered on January 3, 2020, after a suspicious email was detected. Forensic investigation revealed an unauthorized individual accessed certain employee email accounts, potentially viewing personal information of customers including names, addresses, SSNs, financial account details, and medical information. The breach date listed by the CA AG is October 21, 2019. Verigent reset passwords, implemented MFA, engaged forensics, and notified the FBI. Complimentary credit monitoring was offered.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.