Confirmed breach. Intrusion Jun 20, 2024–Jul 5, 2024, discovered Jul 6, 2024 — the first regulatory filing landed 244 days later (flagged late). 114,945 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksMaryland✗ MD AG >90dLeak gap✗ Leak >180dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
114,945
Data types
4
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Health (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
IN MD
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jul 1, 2024 → Jul 5, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Community Care Alliance, a healthcare provider, notified Maryland AG of a data breach occurring July 1-5, 2024. Unauthorized actors accessed systems containing PII (names, SSNs, DLs) and PHI (diagnoses, lab results, medications) for 14 Maryland residents. Notifications were sent March 7, 2025, offering 12 months of credit monitoring.
Affected (this filing): 14
MD AG >90dLeak >180d
🏎️Indiana State AGMost recentlinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Community Care Alliance reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-06-20 and was reported on 2025-03-07. 4 Indiana residents were affected. 114,945 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 114,945
Leak >180d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.