Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filing window May 26, 2026 → May 28, 2026. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_3e3f0e8f4d8f4c17 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Government ID · PHI · PII
GA TX VT
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Apr 17, 2026
Reported by TEXAS AG filing
ERMI LLC reported to HHS on 2026-05-26 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 74074 individuals. Breached information located on Email.
Affected (this filing): 74,074
ERMI LLC reported a data breach to the Vermont Attorney General. The breach was reported to the AGO on 2026-05-26. The reporting organization type is Health Care. 3 Vermont residents were affected. Categories of data breached: Health Records.
ERMI LLC based in Atlanta, Georgia, a healthcare – medical provider entity reported a data breach to the Texas Attorney General. The breach was discovered on 2026-04-17 and reported on 2026-05-28. 9,453 Texas residents were affected. 74,074 individuals affected in total. Types of information involved: Name of individual;Social Security Number Information;Driver’s License number;Financial Information (e.g. account number, credit or debit card number);Medical Information;Health Insurance Information;Date of Birth. Consumers were notified via U.S. Mail.
Affected (this filing): 9,453
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.