Confirmed breach. discovered Jun 8, 2026 — the first regulatory filing landed 31 days later (flagged late). 1,029 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksTexas✗ TX AG >30dLeak gap⏱ Leak >30dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
1,029
Data types
2
Government ID · PII
Jurisdictions
2
TX VT
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach discoveredAG web form
Jun 8, 2026
Reported by TEXAS AG filing
31 days
🍁Vermont State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
The Law Offices of Rakesh Mehrotra reported a data breach to the Vermont Attorney General. The breach was reported to the AGO on 2026-07-09. The reporting organization type is Other Commercial. 1 Vermont residents were affected. Categories of data breached: Social Security Numbers.
The Law Offices of Rakesh Mehrotra based in Reston, Virginia, a other entity reported a data breach to the Texas Attorney General. The breach was discovered on 2026-06-08 and reported on 2026-07-10. 1,029 Texas residents were affected. 7,148 individuals affected in total. Types of information involved: Name of individual;Social Security Number Information;Driver’s License number;Government-issued ID number (e.g. passport, state ID card). Consumers were notified via U.S. Mail.
Affected (this filing): 1,029
TX AG >30d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.