Medical Associates of Brevard, LLC reported to HHS on 2025-09-05 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 246711 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server.
Affected (this filing): 246,711
Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filing window Sep 5, 2025 → Sep 9, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_23a3e47222db4b92 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
FL IN NH
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Jan 17, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Jul 7, 2025
Reported by NEW HAMPSHIRE AG filing
Medical Associates of Brevard, LLC reported to HHS on 2025-09-05 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 246711 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server.
Affected (this filing): 246,711
Medical Associates of Brevard LLC reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2025-01-17 and was reported on 2025-09-05. 181 Indiana residents were affected. 246,711 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 246,711
Medical Associates of Brevard, LLC notified the New Hampshire Attorney General of a criminal cyberattack affecting 100 NH residents. Discovered July 7, 2025, the incident exposed PII including names, SSNs, driver's licenses, and PHI. MAB secured systems, replaced firewalls, and provided 12 months of credit monitoring.
Affected (this filing): 100
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.