Clustered 2 filings across 1 jurisdiction · filing window Jun 5, 2015 → Jun 9, 2015. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_1be34d58d44e453f · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
Health (basic) · Identity (basic) · Government ID
CA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
May 9, 2015 → May 18, 2015
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
May 18, 2015
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG, HHS OCR filings
Blue Shield of California disclosed an unauthorized disclosure of Protected Health Information (PHI) resulting from a website code update on May 9, 2015. A vulnerability allowed authorized users to view another user's PHI, including names, SSNs, and dates of birth, between May 9 and May 18, 2015. The website was taken offline, the code was fixed, and affected individuals were offered one year of credit monitoring.
Blue Shield of California (California Physicians' Service) reported to HHS on 2015-06-09 an Unauthorized Access/Disclosure affecting 843 individuals. On May 18, 2015, a faulty web portal code update allowed authorized users to inadvertently access PHI of individuals outside their line of business. Exposed data included names, addresses, birthdates, and SSNs. The portal was disabled, a patch deployed, and the responsible developer was sanctioned. OCR reviewed the entity's HIPAA Notice of Privacy Practices and confirmed corrective actions. Breached information located on Network Server.
Affected (this filing): 843
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.