Clustered 3 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Aug 20, 2024 → Sep 23, 2024. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_11426b1d59bc469a · merge_method llm · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Identity (basic) · Government ID · PII
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
IN VT
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
May 23, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Jun 29, 2024
Reported by VERMONT AG filings
Patelco Credit Union reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-05-23 and was reported on 2024-08-20. 1,403 Indiana residents were affected. 1,009,472 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 1,009,472
Patelco Credit Union notified Vermont and Rhode Island AGs of a ransomware attack. Unauthorized access occurred May 23, 2024, detected June 29, 2024. Data accessed included names, SSNs, driver's licenses, DOBs, and emails. 54 Rhode Island residents confirmed affected. Patelco contained the threat, restored data, notified law enforcement, and offered 24 months of Experian IdentityWorks.
Patelco Credit Union notified Vermont and Rhode Island residents of a ransomware attack detected on June 29, 2024. Unauthorized access occurred starting May 23, 2024. Data accessed included names, SSNs, driver's license numbers, dates of birth, and email addresses. 54 Rhode Island residents were explicitly identified as impacted. Patelco contained the threat, restored data, notified law enforcement, and engaged external cybersecurity professionals. Affected individuals were offered 24 months of Experian IdentityWorks.
Affected (this filing): 54
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.