Clustered 3 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window May 7, 2021 → May 18, 2021. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_09ea61c9a0b74386 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
CA MT
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Nov 22, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Dec 1, 2020
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
San Diego Family Care reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2021-05-07. The breach occurred from 11/22/2020 to 12/3/2020. 16 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 16
San Diego Family Care notified individuals of a data breach involving its IT hosting provider. In December 2020, the provider experienced an incident resulting in data encryption. On January 20, 2021, SDFC learned unauthorized access may have occurred. Affected data included names, SSNs, dates of birth, medical diagnoses, and insurance info. SDFC engaged forensics and is offering identity protection.
San Diego Family Care reported to HHS on 2021-05-18 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 154,513 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. A business associate experienced a ransomware attack affecting ePHI including names, addresses, SSNs, driver's license numbers, DOBs, lab results, medications, and financial information.
Affected (this filing): 154,513
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.