Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filed Sep 9, 2024. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_02fe515355e147ef · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Financial account
MT VT WI
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Sep 28, 2023
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Oct 4, 2023
Reported by VERMONT AG filing
Richland County, WI reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2024-09-09. The breach occurred from 9/28/2023 to 10/26/2023. 21 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 21
Richland County, WI reported to HHS on 2024-09-09 a Hacking/IT Incident (cyber-attack) affecting 76,365 individuals. PHI located on a Network Server was compromised. Exposed data included names, addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, driver's license and Social Security numbers, financial and health insurance information, medications, and other treatment information. The CE provided credit/identity monitoring services and implemented additional administrative and technical safeguards.
Affected (this filing): 76,365
Richland County, WI notified consumers of a data breach detected on October 4, 2023. Unauthorized access occurred between September 28 and October 26, 2023, potentially exposing full names. The county engaged forensic investigators, secured its network, and offered complimentary Experian IdentityWorks credit monitoring. No evidence of identity theft was found.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.